The United States has proposed taking over the planned transport corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan claiming to advance long-stalled diplomatic negotiations between the two Caucasus nations, the US ambassador to Turkey, Tom Barrack, told journalists during a briefing on Friday.
Although Armenia and Azerbaijan reached consensus on a draft peace agreement in March, Baku continues to insist on several additional conditions before formally signing the deal.
Iran has always announced that it opposes any geopolitical changes in the region.
To know more about the issue and US goals, TABNAK reached out to Larry Cata Backer Professor of Law and International Affairs at Penn State University, USA. He is also a member of the American Law Institute and the European Corporate Governance Institute.
Following is the full text of the interview
The US says it aims to facilitate peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia. What are the real goals of the US?
Today, States appear to be furiously focused on pathways, corridors, channels, routes, conduits, frequencies, outlets—transport corridors--and the like. In a sense, one can say that the Chinese Belt & Road vision of “Silk Roads” (land based, maritime, cyber, etc.), one that splashed onto the global scene over a decade ago, has triumphed spectacularly. In the process, the idea that the global order might be re-imagined through the power of establishing, or re-imagining ancient trade routes—“Silk Roads”—now assumes greater geo-political significance. These pathways, trade routes, and channels for the movement of goods, people, investment, technology, and strategic/military power—that is corridors around and through which power (economic, political. Social, and cultural) can be organized and exercised—have become a critical element in the way in which States now conceive of and manage power. A mere half generation ago global elites could speak to the organization of a singular set of pathways and routes for the better and more efficient management of a unified system of movement of goods, investment, people, and cultural/societal organs for the greater glory of global convergence. Today those pathways become the competitive spaces within and through or around which fractured powers can be exercised and groups of leading States can compete for domination with respect to those matters of importance to them—including checking the power of opponent, and generating wealth.
These pathways are both territorial and physical, or they may be more ethereal and abstract. Today one considers the competition among leading States and those with ambitions to be greater than they are now, along a variety of channels. One speaks to the Polar trade routes, the control of choke points in maritime commercial routes, and the construction of anchoring elements along those routes—ports, distribution centers, and the security apparatus necessary to protect all of this. But one also speaks about routes of finance, of tech based interactions, and of ideas—the control and projection of which have become as valuable, perhaps even more valuable, than the old physical routes. One can also speak about supply and production chains, or resource chains, or of migratory chains or routes. None of this is new, of course, but its applications in a tech saturated context and after the fracture of the great experiment in global convergence produces additional layers of manifestation of routes and control beyond the ancient pathways of merchants, religious communities, and the pathways created by mass migrations all over the globe for millennia.
For the moment the triumph is better understood as conceptual, though even its conceptual basis is still undergoing development. Nonetheless the idea, and the ideal, of pathways, corridors, channels, conduits, and the like has become a dominant motif of the organization and exercise of geo-political power centers, and, consequentially, of strategic importance to those secondary powers which might exploit their relationships with superior powers by, for example, aligning objectives. Law has also changed to meet the need or desires of State “clients.” Where territorial acquisition of those spaces necessary to manifest these pathways was once essential, other methods have become better refined. Among them are leases, control arrangements based on contract or ownership of legal personality with specific rights and prerogatives, and the like. The possibilities that can be manifested through law allows the passing of effective control of a space, production, action, or object, without transferring ownership. And the nature of that transfer of control can have as different a set of characteristics and objectives as the creativity of lawyers, politicians, official, and military personnel can dream up. Those dreams can even eliminate the State itself as the “face” of control. Companies or other bodies corporate, can be established to effect the sport of control deemed
More specifically, ne can also speak about roadways—more generally transport corridors. These can be understood as a string of ports along a water route—or they can be understood as a roadway (and surrounding areas) between two parts of one State which must be built within the sovereign territory of another, hostile, State. In this case, one speaks about the Zangezur Corridor in Armenia that might connect, physically, two parts of Azerbaijan, the control and operation of which constitutes a critical part of the at least momentary resolution of the conflict between those two States and the return of a state of NOT war (one ought to hesitate to call it peace). Beyond the connection of Azerbaijani territory, it is expected to enhance trade routes in the region: “On Azerbaijan’s side, the corridor would be integrated into the Horadiz-Agbend transport highway and railway network. On Turkey’s side, it would link into the Nakhchivan-Igdir-Kars railway and highway, providing a direct land route to Anatolia and beyond.”
And this gets to the heart of this most profound question, the answer to which is now much easier to understand. To facilitate this peace among two States the officials of which have little love and less trust for each other, the United States, through the U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye, Thomas Barrack, who suggested that a U.S. company (either existing or established for this purpose) for manage the corridor for a century. The U.S. State Department in its 17 July Press Briefing indicated both a desire for peace in the region but also that the matter was one for the President. That would advance the cause of peace, perhaps, by meeting Azerbaijan’s demand that the Corridor not be controlled by Armenia, but it does not resolve a host of other issues that also require resolution.
The Americans, of course, would advance more than peace (or at least the cessation of military conflict) between these two States for the moment. I have spoken about the transactional nature of American foreign policy elsewhere (The "Merchant" (商), the "Bureaucrat" (士) and the "Tariff War"). In that respect, the 100 year lease would generate revenue for a U.S. enterprise. It would also advance a number of other U.S. interests. The first would be a set of “blocking interests.” That is, the lease would effectively deny control of the corridor to U.S: competitors—Russia and China principally. Indeed, it has been argued that the proposal represents a way of inserting a more direct U.S. presence in an area that has traditionally been within the core of Russian security guarantees and ordering. At the same time, it is not clear whether the control of the corridor would adversely impact Iranian interests. The Iranian ambassador to Armenia was quoted as maintaining that Iran does not consider Armenia’s relations with Western States to be a step against Iran. At the same time, it is possible to see in the proposal a challenge for the current state of transport and transportation routes that could affect Iran, and certainly Russia. And lastly, of course, are the potential changes that might be possible with respect to the routing of energy products, perhaps primarily petroleum. With a U.S. based sanctions regime, that could affect Russian and Iranian exports, and the ability of China to acquire or distribute those products. On the other hand, the proposal, backed by the Turkish government, may well enhance economic conditions in its eastern provinces. In the end, though, and depending on what is actually developed, the benefits for the United States, should it choose to exploit them, could be significant. Thes essence of the benefit would come from the possibilities of exploiting control of this corridor for the development of aligned or complementary economic and security transactions that could better ties the region to the larger transport and control corridors of the United States and its allies. It is the value of enhanced transactions that has caught people’s attention.
All of this is speculation at the moment, though the idea has value and poses less risk to the region than other alternatives. And it might well build on the American transactional model that could provide venues for economic exploitation by all parties as sub-routes and complementary enterprises may be developed , some of which will produce pathways to virtually all States in the region. This applies to larger projects as well as the manufacture and sale of consumer goods and the processing and transport of natural resources. Standardization of tech based goods and services; the embedding of financial instruments and practices within the larger U.S. umbrella are always possible. But at the same time, one starts merely with the possibility that the United States—through an economic instrumentality, ostensibly private—may operate in the Zangezur Corridor the way that the Chinese operate the Panama Canal. One the one hand that is fairly modest, on the other the United States has gone to a great deal of trouble to replace the Chinese operators of the Panama Canal, and the Chinese have resisted the effort.
Lastly, and this bears some thought, the effective control of the operations of the Zangezur Corridor can provide the United States with an enhanced security presence in the region. That security presence can be used to protect U.S. and allied assets in the region. At the same time, it can serve to enhance the ability of the United States to more effectively project its sanctions based regimes in the region. The United States, at this juncture is interested in trade based transactional benefits—that aligns with the overall vision of the Trump Administration. But Presidential Administrations change with some frequency in the United States—its security architecture less so—and a succeeding Administration may be able to use the structures on the ground to different effect.
What can be the advantages and possible disadvantages of the US proposal for Baku and Yerevan?
The answer is straightforward. For Baku the immediate advantage is the elimination of threat by Armenia. Whatever peace emerges will be fragile at best. Virtually any gust of wind could upset it as structures or operation. The temptation to use the corridor as a bargaining chip or to assert pressure would, in the calculus of Baku, be too risky. American control offers a way around the threat of Armenian control. At the same time, because as offered to date, the proposal does not contemplate American political control, nor even a leasehold held by the United States itself, but rather with an American company, then issues of foreign control of territory or routes can be minimized as a formal matter. However, the proposal also has risks. Because a foreign enterprise controls the corridor, Baku also could not use it as a means of pressuring Yerevan in the event of deteriorating relations. Just as Armenia could not do as it liked, Baku would also be subject to decisions about what can be transported and by whom, decisions made by a foreign company, subject, ultimately top control by a foreign power, or at least, sensitive to the interests of that foreign power. Connected to that would be the necessary guarantees to make the corridor operate effectively. Provision for the location and operation of an American, or U.S. controlled, military and security apparatus would have to be made. Those would operate, of course, strictly according to the terms of the agreement, but they would also produce consequential benefits to its operators.
Yerevan faces the same cluster of benefits and risks. To secure piece it will have to give up a bit of its effective sovereign authority over its territory. It would have to suffer the movement of things and people across its territory effectively without any means of controlling. Left unanswered, for the moment, are the conditions built into the management of the corridor—the extent to which Armenia might have access to information about what is crossing through its borders (something Baku would likely object to), the issue of taxation and inspection of goods that use the corridor, and the effective interdiction of goods that would be viewed as a threat to Armenia. More importantly, perhaps, are the mechanisms developed to police abuse. It is inevitable that corridors of this kind can be used for all sorts of transport, that corruption will be an issue, and that accountability will be difficult. Perhaps the idea behind the use of a U.S company, and perhaps U.S. public oversight, would be to minimize these threats.
But one would have to factor them in as a “cost of peace” or in modern terminology, a “cost of doing business” in pursuit of the absence of belligerence. Yerevan, like Baku, would have to factor in the way that such a deal would affect its regional relationships. There are three actors that are most likely to matter most—Russia, Turkey and Iran. Russian relations are likely the most delicate, though relations with Turkey the most sensitive. On the other hand, the possibility of collateral benefits—especially better fitting into pathways and networks that avoid dependence on Russia may be a net long term benefit to Yerevan. Nonetheless a critical consideration for Yerevan might be to be included in the possible emerging regional transport network that can result with the operation of the Corridor, for example into the Horadiz-Agbend and the Nakhchivan-Igdir-Kars transport systems. That would be usefully included in any agreement respecting the lease and operation of the Corridor.
In any case for both there will be something like a dissonance between forms and effects if this is to work. The greatest sensitivities will be on the outward forms of the transactions—the nature of the lease, the leaseholder, the forms of responsibilities and authority of the leaseholder, the nature of extent of American security and operational guarantees, and the forms and respect for sovereign rights for both parties. The greatest risk and benefit, though, will flow from the effects, the operational realities, of any transaction of this kind. And those will not likely flow directly from the corridor’s operations itself, but from the way that this corridor might produce synergistic benefits in the forms of capillary transactions that lead out of the region in ways that allow both Baku and Yerevan some greater ability to make money, secure their security positions, and avoid greater dependency on regional powers.
How can this affect China's one road- one belt project? and basically what are the possible security and economic threats of the US proposal to China?
The effect on China’s Bet & Road Initiative (BRI) can be both positive and negative. On the positive side—roads are roads; connectivity is connectivity, etc. To the extent that the Zangezur Corridor operates effectively there is little to impede Chinese use of the Corridor within the transport needs and operations of Azerbaijan. One also ought to remember that Armenia is also a Belt & Road Initiative Partner. Though a 2020 report suggested that Armenia is not a key element of the Belt & Road Initiative in the region, its position could be enhanced through strategic leveraging of the Zangezur Corridor operation. For example—one might envision a scenario (eventually) in which Armenia also uses the Zangezur Corridor operations for the movement of its own goods. Azerbaijan is a more active BRI member and its trade with China has been notable. And it is growing—after a meeting in April 2025 between President Aliyev and Xi Jinping, on 23 June 2025, President Ilham Aliyev approved a cooperation plan with China to advance BRI Certainly the American operations of the Corridor could induce the Chinese to invest more heavily in infrastructure in the region. It should be noted that for the moment Chinese authorities have refrained from suggesting that China could serve as the substitute operator of the Zangezur Corridor.
On the negative side, of course, an American presence will inevitably put pressure on the space within which China can operate unimpeded in the region. Nonetheless it should be remembered that for the moment the American objectives are transactional and markets based. There is little that suggests the more comprehensive ambitions of the Chinese BRI, at least formally. Informally, however, elements of security arrangements, people to people exchanges and closer economic ties may serve as a competing, though informal, model to the BRI. Lastly, it is also possible that the U.S. will operate under the radar in the sense that BRI is a state-to-state enterprise. The America First project, which could well include the operation of the corridor, is private and transactional. It can be effected directly or through private intermediaries in the region. As such, the net effect on Chinese ambitions in the region will be hard to detect. That leaves the greater threat—the insertion of the United States in the region may complicate Chinese transactional efforts where they run up against American sanctions programs—including with respect to Xinjiang and around the Russo-Ukrainian War. While there may be an effect, at this point anything more concrete would be quite speculative.
The EU has supported the US proposal; can this create any possible security or economic threats to Russia's interest in the region?
Just as the Azerbaijani side has been playing the China card in negotiations over operational control of the Corridor, it appears that Armenia has been playing the E.U and Russia card to the same effect. A 16 July report suggested that the Armenian Prime Minister noted interest from the European Union in managing the transport corridor, something that came up during the course of the Prime Minister’s visit to Brussels and Paris on 14 July. And, in the typical style of political negotiations, the Prime Minister did not rule out a role for Russia. These reports provide the atmospherics behind which negotiations may proceed less impeded by media intrusion. On the other hand this might signal that neither side is as yet firmly committed to the idea of outside control. It is more likely that this media “noise” on both sides suggests that serious negotiations are already commencing somewhere. Beyond that, it is as likely that the European Union will complement U.S. efforts rather than take the lead. Given the current geo-political situation closer to home European leaders may not now have the capacity to provide Armenia and Azerbaijan what they desire—and need—to make this work.
Armenia had announced that it would not hand over the control of the corridor to a third party but to push Armenia, Turkey has told Yerevan that the new developments have been against Iran. Do you think that Yerevan will finally accept the US proposal? How can this affect Iran's interest?
Logic suggests that Armenia has little choice but to accept something. The corridor is inevitable given the realities of the situation on the ground. The question about the way that it can be made to work effectively remains an open issue. For the Armenians, the Americans are likely the best bet. That bet is enhanced where the Americans operate in the background, so that one can minimizing the political optics of an “American” presence in the Corridor. At the same time, given recent events, the Americans appear in the best position to deliver effective management with the possibility of deploying quite severe penalties for breaches. The problem remains that American Administrations change.
For Iran, the operation of the Corridor by a U.S. company under a long term lease is probably the best of a difficult situation. There will be no direct American military presence. However, the presence of American personnel and an American enterprise in the region presents a trip wire that can call in severe countermeasures if these operations are negatively impacted. That winds up effectively as a net zero change of risk overall, through a change in the risk composition. More difficult will be the extent to which the Corridor management can be used to police and enforce American sanctions against Iranian officials and enterprises. But even that is likely manageable given the alternatives in the region.
If finally Armenia agrees with opening of the corridor, what is the best strategy for Iran to face the reality on the ground?
This is a difficult question, and one that is heavily dependent on the objectives of the Iranian government for the short and the long term. In the short term, Iranian strategies might well focus on containing any potential negative impact from the operation of the transport corridor under U.S. company management. That may involve lobbying for protective terms (through either party) in the negotiation of the lease, or engaging in negotiations for workarounds to protect Iranian interests in the region. The cost of those work arounds may be significantly affected by the lease terms. But knowledge of the changed environment would provide a useful first step toward considering responses. In the longer term, regional alignments or at least the cultivation of positive working relationships would have to be the goal. And that would require, in all likelihood a three sided approach. The first would involve structing frameworks among Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan and Armenia. The second would involve an architecture that includes Russia (first) and China, though the interests and needs of those two States are distinct enough to warrant differentiated strategies. And the last would involve developing functionally differentiated relationships involving linkages among these states—effectively a layered but coordinated approach in which these States could be embedded in Iranian pathways. One ends, then, where one began—with a furious focus on pathways, their control and exploitation. The key to success at every level of geo-politics, it now appears, is to have a quite comprehensive understanding of the existence, characteristics and exploitative potential of these pathways as a function of national aspirations, objectives and security concerns.
Interview by Payman Yazdani
