As the Iran-US talks entered the third round and technical and expert discussions began, it was expected that there would be fluctuations in the negotiations, especially since the American side (as an internal factor) has been changing its positions at every moment.
Mike Waltz, the U.S. National Security Advisor, was dismissed by Trump. It is said that one of the reasons for his dismissal was his private meeting with Netanyahu and coordinating with him about a military strike on Iran. On the other hand, Marco Rubio, while retaining his position as Secretary of State, has taken over the role of U.S. National Security Advisor. Accordingly, given his more hardline stance compared to Steve Witkoff, he will play a greater role in matters related to Iran. What is your assessment?
This is a sign of divisions and disagreements within the Trump administration between the super-hard liners and the hard liners, particularly in their relationships with the Netanyahu government. It is difficult to predict which line will prevail because, eventually, it will be up to Trump to decide, but at least it is known that he does not want any military confrontation with Iran that could start a regional war.
Some argue that the Iran nuclear dossier may be handed over to the State Department and Marco Rubio personally. Rubio has recently shifted his position on Iran's nuclear program from complete dismantlement (the Libya model) to ‘zero enrichment’ (the UAE model). Do you think negotiations with Iran might be transferred to him?
Most probably, Trump will want to keep this negotiation under his control, and it is unlikely that the State Secretary himself, with so many other burning issues to care of, will afford to get personally involved in the talks. The positive aspect could be that professional diplomats and experts with knowledge of the issue would be involved and certainly that would be an advantage over political appointees and cronies who hardly know anything about the topic.
Can the delay in negotiations with Iran be seen as a restructuring and alignment of the Trump administration's views on Iran?
It is said that Mike Waltz’s perspective created inconsistencies in the Trump administration's approach to Iran. This is typical of Trump's approach: improvisation, versatility, ideology, lack of preparedness and expertise, power struggles, etc. Just like in the case of Ukraine or Gaza, Trump believed that he could solve the issues quickly while a sensitive problem like Iran's nuclear program needs a thorough understanding of all the complex technical and geopolitical aspects to carry out proper and effective negotiations.
Marco Rubio recently stated that Iran has no right to enrich uranium. However, the NPT grants countries the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, this right was given to Iran under the JCPOA, and therefore, based on the principle of estoppel, a right that has once been recognized cannot be revoked from Iran. What is your assessment?
In fact, the NPT does not grant any specific right to enrichment of uranium as such: many countries exercise their right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy without enriching uranium, that they can procure on the market. The JCPOA did recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium but under very strict conditions to avoid any diversion to military uses. So if a new agreement is concluded, it would need to include similar assurances. What would be helpful would be more transparency on the part of Iran to explain how it plans to use enriched uranium, because, at the moment, for its Bushehr reactor, the low-enriched uranium is supplied by Russia. There is no justified civil use of 60%-enriched uranium.
In justifying his argument that Iran does not need uranium enrichment, Rubio claimed that only countries with nuclear bombs engage in uranium enrichment. However, countries without nuclear bombs, such as Japan and Brazil, have indigenous enrichment programs. What is your assessment?
This shows the degree of ignorance of US leaders. Indeed, some non-nuclear weapon states do have uranium enrichment programs, but such programs are for low-level enrichment and are conducted under strict safeguards to ensure that they remain purely peaceful.
European countries are talking about possibly triggering the snapback mechanism. Could these countries sabotage a potential agreement between Iran and the U.S. with such a move? Under what circumstances would they refrain from taking such action?
If the prospects of a US-Iran deal are serious and the agreement is effective in allowing some return to the pre-US withdrawal situation, European countries will certainly support such a deal. The mention of snapback may be useful as a means of pressure in the current talks, but in case the US lifts its sanctions as part of the deal, there would be no logic for imposing EU sanctions.
