Iran and the the US reached a MoU recently and now delegations from both countries are in Swiss to follow up post-MoU measures to reach an agreement in 60 days.
TABNAK reached out to Marc Finaud a senior advisor and associate fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and former French Foreign Ministry spoksman to shed more light on the developments.
Following is the full text of the interview:
Iran and the United States have reached a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and after signing it in Geneva, they are set to begin 60 days of negotiations on the nuclear issue. Trump has announced that Iran can engage in low-enrichment uranium enrichment, and in return, sanctions on Iran will be waived. Isn't this the same formula as the JCPOA?
Yes indeed, at first sight it looks like getting back to square one, which shows that the JCPOA was a sound agreement despite Trump's decision to withdraw from it. However, as always the devil will be in the detail so we need to wait until the final agreement to evaluate it.
Trump initially insisted on "zero enrichment" and the transfer of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to the US. He has now backed down on both points. In several interviews before the understanding, he emphasized that Iran's enriched uranium could be destroyed (diluted) inside the country with the help of the US or the IAEA. Doesn't this amount to a kind of failure in his declared objectives for waging a war against Iran?
Certainly, but here again we need to see the final text to determine how it will work. In any case, as many experts considered, it was foolish and unrealistic to think that the United States military could discover, recover, and seize Iran's stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium on its own without any cooperation with Iran. Obviously, if Iran accepts to ship its stockpile outside the country as it did under the JCPOA, there would be a need for international cooperation and the involvement of the IAEA.
Currently, sharp criticism of Trump has emerged from some Israeli officials and certain figures in the Republican Party. Trump has stated that Netanyahu should be happy with this agreement because it does not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. In contrast, some right-wing ministers in the Israeli government have declared that regarding Lebanon, they will not be bound by the US agreement with Iran. Given these circumstances, what will Israel's approach to this agreement be? Will it seek to undermine it? If so, what leverage does Trump have?
Here again we have a sense of deja-vu: when the JCPOA was concluded in 2015, Netanyahu was very critical while his security establishment, in private, considered that the agreement removed any existential threat against Israel. Now, under the pressure of the most extremist members of his coalition, Netanyahu can only express dissatisfaction. The war against Iran was launched by the United States to please Israel, but none of the war objectives have been reached. If Israel does not abide by the ceasefire with Iran or Lebanon, Trump may react negatively because it would undermine his claimed "victory". He could consider reducing arms transfers to Israel as he did during the Gaza war, although the impact was limited.
Some argue that the most important issue for Trump right now is the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and after the FIFA World Cup, Trump might attack Iran. This argument is challenged from the perspective that if there were a need for another attack, Trump would have continued the war until his objectives were achieved. What is your assessment?
Because of the upcoming mid-term elections and his concern about the war's impact on the US economy, Trump most likely will avoid returning to hostilities. His allies in the Gulf will also put pressure on him because they suffered from the war, which revealed the failure of the American military protection.
Perhaps one point that received less attention was Trump's comment that Washington could play the role of "regional guardian" in exchange for receiving 20% of the region's revenues. What is your assessment of this statement? Does it provide a basis for a new regional order based on much more money than before in exchange for security? Doesn't the recent war experience contradict this?
With Trump, of course, we can expect anything. There is a traditional US policy aiming to control the Middle East for its strategic importance in terms of energy and trade routes. A pragmatic and mutually beneficial arrangement with Iran (and probably Oman, the other riparian state of the strait) is not totally inconceivable whereby passage through the strait would entail technical fees like in the large canals (Suez, Panama). But it is not clear at this stage whether such an agreement will emerge from the talks.
