As the Iran-US talks entered the third round and technical and expert discussions began, it was expected that there would be fluctuations in the negotiations, especially since the American side (as an internal factor) has been changing its positions at every moment.
Mike Waltz, the U.S. National Security Advisor, was dismissed by Trump. It is said that one of the reasons for his dismissal was his private meeting with Netanyahu and coordinating with him about a military strike on Iran. On the other hand, Marco Rubio, while retaining his position as Secretary of State, has taken over the role of U.S. National Security Advisor. Accordingly, given his more hardline stance compared to Steve Witkoff, he will play a greater role in matters related to Iran. What is your assessment?
Yes, it seems that Mike Waltz incurred President Trump’s anger by talking with Prime Minister Netanyahu about bombing Iran. While Trump himself has spoken of military action as a fallback option if diplomacy does not succeed in preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, Trump wants to avoid a war. He doesn’t want to be pressured into military action by subordinates or by allies. Marco Rubio was chosen to replace Waltz temporarily because he seems to be better at reading Trump’s mind and echoing his statements. Until now, I would not have assessed that Waltz is more hardline than Rubio. But Rubio is more willing to adjust his past positions in order to accord with Trump’s latest position.
Some argue that the Iran nuclear dossier may be handed over to the State Department and Marco Rubio personally. Rubio has recently shifted his position on Iran's nuclear program from complete dismantlement (the Libya model) to ‘zero enrichment’ (the UAE model). Do you think negotiations with Iran might be transferred to him?
In any previous administration, Republican or Democratic, it would be natural for the Secretary of State to be in charge of key negotiations such as the Iran nuclear talks. This responsibility is even more likely when the Secretary of State is concurrently the National Security Advisor. But in the Trump world, past precedents do not necessarily apply; nothing can be taken for granted. Unless Steve Witkoff blunders in Trump’s eyes, I do not see the negotiations being handed over to Rubio.
Can the delay in negotiations with Iran be seen as a restructuring and alignment of the Trump administration's views on Iran? It is said that Mike Waltz’s perspective created inconsistencies in the Trump administration's approach to Iran.
When there are major changes in personnel and apparent differences within the administration in describing the goal for the negotiations, it is natural to seek a delay. The Trump team needs to make sure that they are all singing from the same sheet, if I may use a figure of speech. A “restructuring and alignment of views” is a polite way of putting it.
Marco Rubio recently stated that Iran has no right to enrich uranium. However, the NPT grants countries the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Moreover, this right was given to Iran under the JCPOA, and therefore, based on the principle of estoppel, a right that has once been recognized cannot be revoked from Iran. What is your assessment?
I would not say that the JCPOA “gave” Iran the right to enrichment. Rather, it “allowed” Iran to enrich. I suppose that in a court of law one could raise the principle of estoppel as an argument against disallowing enrichment, but diplomatic negotiations are not a court of law. Also, please note that the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy stated in the NPT is conditional on conformity with the non-proliferation obligations of the treaty. Recall that in 2006, because of Iran’s safeguards violations, the UN Security Council mandated that it suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
In justifying his argument that Iran does not need uranium enrichment, Rubio claimed that only countries with nuclear bombs engage in uranium enrichment. However, countries without nuclear bombs, such as Japan and Brazil, have indigenous enrichment programse. What is your assessment?
Rubio clearly exaggerated. In addition to Japan and Brazil, the Netherlands and Germany enrich uranium under the Urenco consortium. But Rubio’s main point is true: Iran does not need uranium enrichment for civil purposes. It can buy enriched uranium fuel on the global market, as almost all other nuclear-energy producing states do. It is not economically viable for a state with fewer than 10-20 nuclear power reactors to produce its own fuel. Iran’s reasons for doing so are for nuclear hedging, to give it a weapons option.
European countries, including France, are talking about possibly triggering the snapback mechanism. Could these countries sabotage a potential agreement between Iran and the U.S. with such a move? Under what circumstances would they refrain from taking such action?
The UN snapback mechanism is useful leverage to encourage Iran to pull back from its march to a nuclear weapons option. If negotiations do not succeed in strictly limiting Iran’s nuclear program, then there is a good possibility that France and the UK will trigger UN snapback sanctions. They would have to weigh Iran’s threat to withdraw from the NPT, which might just be a bluff. It is inconceivable that they would trigger snapback sanctions in order to sabotage the negotiations. This would go against their policies and principles.
