Russia's Lavrov says BRICS could play key role in shaping Greater Eurasian Partnership

TABNAK, Feb. 09 - In an exclusive interview with TV BRICS, the head of Russia’s foreign ministry assessed BRICS’ role on the global stage, the prospects for the group’s development, and the objectives of India’s 2026 chairmanship.

News ID: 7153

Date: 09 February 2026 - 17:35

Mr. Lavrov, 10 February is annually marked in Russia as Diplomatic Worker’s Day – the professional holiday of employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Russia’s overseas missions. You presumably always mark this day at work. How do you assess this holiday? How important is it for you and your colleagues? And, more broadly, what do you consider to be the main results of the Ministry’s work?

When it comes to results, it is probably not for us to judge. We have the President, to whom we are subordinated in accordance with the Constitution, and who defines Russia’s foreign policy, including approving the Foreign Policy Concept. The latest version was endorsed in March 2023 and reflects the significant, long-term, systemic changes occurring globally, which dominate the focus of our practical work.

Of course, it is also important that with each partner country, on the basis of agreements reached by Presidents and Prime Ministers, we develop specific plans in trade and economic cooperation, investment, and scientific collaboration, as well as coordinated action in international fora – at the United Nations and other organisations. Particular attention is naturally paid to the CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO and, more broadly, the post-Soviet space. This everyday work is built on long-term planning and delivers tangible, mutual benefits both for us and for our partners.

At the same time, the ongoing transformation on the global stage, which began some time ago with the objective shift towards a multipolar world, is crucial. This is no longer bipolarity, as it was during the era of the Soviet Union and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO; nor is it the unipolar moment that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is precisely multipolarity that now defines the trajectory of global development.

For many years, the United States acted as a driver of the global economy and a regulator of global finance, using the role of the dollar to consolidate its dominant position. Today, it is objectively losing its economic influence and its weight in the world economy.

At the same time, countries such as the People’s Republic of China, India and Brazil are rising. On the African continent, very interesting developments are taking place, with African nations increasingly seeking to retain their natural resources domestically and develop their industries, following a path supported historically by the Soviet Union.

And so on. That is to say, many centres of rapid economic growth have emerged – centres of power, centres of financial influence and political influence – and the world is being reshaped. This is taking place amid competitive rivalry.

The West is reluctant to relinquish its formerly dominant positions. With the arrival of the Trump administration, this struggle to suppress competitors became particularly pronounced and open. The Washington administration under Donald Trump did not conceal its ambitions: dominate in energy, restrict competitors. Unfair methods have been used against us—banning Russian oil companies like Lukoil and Rosneft, attempting to control our trade, investment cooperation, and military-technical ties with major strategic partners, such as India and other BRICS members.

That is to say, there is a struggle to preserve the old world order, which was based on the role of the US dollar and on the rules devised by the West and embodied in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.

As new centres of growth began achieving much stronger economic results under these rules, with higher growth rates – as we see across BRICS countries – the West sought to prevent this shift. This is impossible to stop, as the growth rates and purchasing power-adjusted GDP of BRICS countries have already exceeded those of the G7 combined.

I have perhaps taken a slight detour, but both these objective economic shifts and the subjective attempts by declining centres of power to obstruct them constitute the core of our work – not only at the level of global analysis and forecasting, but also in our bilateral relations with every country. All geopolitical confrontations and attempts to impede the course of history inevitably affect bilateral affairs.

There is no need to list everything – sanctions, the so-called shadow fleet invented by the West, attempts to detain vessels on the high seas through the use of force in blatant violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and tariffs imposed for purchasing oil or gas. This has become widespread practice.

The essence of our work can be summed up in words from a well-known song. It happens to be the anthem of Russia’s Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters, but it applies just as well to us – and, indeed, to any state institution:

Our concern is simple,
Our concern is that
Of needin' long life for our motherland
And haven't other concerns…

Today, however, that goal – ensuring the country’s continued existence – is an exceptionally ambitious one. It includes guaranteeing Russia’s security, particularly at a time when certain individuals in Europe, posing as politicians, openly threaten war against our country.

Security also requires preventing the continued existence on our borders of a Nazi state created by the West out of Ukraine and used once again to wage war against Russia. Nazi foundations must be eradicated. We will, without any doubt, safeguard our security interests by preventing the deployment on Ukrainian territory of any weapons that pose a threat to us and by ensuring full and reliable protection of the rights of people who are Russian and Russian-speaking, who have lived for centuries and continue to live in Crimea, Donbas and Novorossiya – people whom the Kyiv regime that came to power after a coup d’état labelled as subhuman and terrorists, unleashing a civil war against them.

This is a fundamental task to ensure the survival of our country, alongside economic and social issues constantly monitored by the President and addressed by the government.

One of the key objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to create the most favourable possible external conditions for Russia’s internal development – economic, social and industrial – and for improving the well-being of our citizens.

Clearly, in the context of a global war unleashed against us and frantic attempts by the West to punish all our partners, demanding that they cease trading with us and cooperating in military-technical areas, fulfilling this task is more difficult than it was even 10–15 years ago.

That does not make it any less relevant. I believe we are doing everything possible to meet the tasks entrusted to us by the President with dignity. Ultimately, it is for the Russian people to judge.

We know that Russian citizens take an active interest in the work of the Ministry. This is gratifying, but it also places significant additional responsibility on us. I hope that during the period leading up to Diplomatic Worker’s Day on 10 February, we aim to share more about our activities and respond comprehensively to citizens’ inquiries, maintaining contact and receiving valuable guidance from public opinion for our practical foreign policy decisions. This is extremely important to us. It is important to understand how they perceive the external challenges facing Russia, as this very often provides us with valuable insights. Public opinion polls and simply expressed wishes addressed to us frequently contain useful guidance when choosing our practical foreign policy steps.

In 2025, the Republic of Indonesia joined BRICS. You have already mentioned India and China. Is it fair to say that BRICS cooperation now takes up an increasing share of your work, and what development prospects do you see?

Absolutely. Everything I have said indicates that, at a time when the West is losing its hegemony but continues to cling to institutions created to sustain it – institutions which can no longer reflect the real balance of power or fairness in international relations – the emergence of new structures is inevitable.

We are not advocating for the abolition of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the WTO. For many years, we have sought to reform these institutions so that, from the moment BRICS was established – and these countries remain the fastest-growing global economies and major trading powers – they would receive proportional votes and rights in all Bretton Woods institutions, commensurate with their actual weight in the global economy, trade, and logistics.

The West has consistently sought to prevent this. President Putin has repeatedly emphasised that we are not refusing to use the US dollar. Under the Biden administration, the United States has taken every step to weaponise the dollar against those it considers inconvenient. At the same time, despite the statements we have heard from the US administration about resolving the war in Ukraine initiated under Biden, negotiating it off the agenda, and thereby opening clear and promising prospects for mutually beneficial Russian-American investment and other cooperation, all the laws that Biden enacted to punish Russia following the commencement of the special military operation were not challenged by the Trump administration. In April, the state of emergency was extended, the core of which is sanctions against Russia, including the freezing of our gold and foreign currency reserves. It explicitly states that this is “in connection with Russia’s hostile foreign policy behaviour.” Examples cited include alleged interference in US elections – which President Trump consistently and categorically opposed – as well as violations of international law and human rights, among other claims.

This represents pure “Bidenism”, which Trump and his team reject. Nevertheless, the law was quietly extended, sanctions against Russia continue, and sanctions were imposed on Lukoil and Rosneft a few weeks after the very positive Putin-Trump meeting in Anchorage.

In other words, we were told that the Ukrainian issue must be resolved. In Anchorage, we accepted the United States’ proposal. To put it straightforwardly, they proposed, and we agreed – the problem should be solved. President Putin has repeatedly stated that for Russia, this is what matters. It is irrelevant what will be said in Ukraine or in Europe, where we observe deep-rooted Russophobia among most regimes in the European Union, with very few exceptions. The position of the United States was important for us. Having accepted their proposals, we essentially fulfilled the task of resolving the Ukrainian issue and moving toward comprehensive, broad, mutually beneficial cooperation.

In practice, however, the opposite occurs: new sanctions are imposed, attacks on tankers are staged in international waters in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and India and other partners are discouraged from purchasing affordable Russian energy, while Europe has long prohibited such purchases, forcing them to buy American liquefied natural gas at significantly higher prices.

Thus, in the economic sphere, the United States has effectively declared a goal of economic domination. Therefore, besides the Ukrainian issue – for which we were prepared – we see no promising future in economic terms. The Americans aim to control all energy supply routes for all leading countries across continents, including in Europe, where they monitor the Nord Stream pipelines, the Ukrainian gas transport system, and the TurkStream pipeline.

I am highlighting this to emphasise that the United States’ objective is global economic dominance, implemented through a wide range of coercive measures inconsistent with fair competition, including tariffs, sanctions, direct prohibitions, and even restrictions on communication for some partners.

We must take all this into account. Therefore, while remaining open to cooperation with all countries – including major powers such as the United States, as well as India, China, Indonesia, and Brazil – in situations where the Americans themselves create artificial obstacles, we are compelled to seek additional secure avenues for the development of our financial, economic, integration, and logistical projects with BRICS countries.

During our BRICS chairmanship two years ago, at the Kazan summit, a number of Russian initiatives were adopted for implementation, including alternative payment platforms, mechanisms for settlements in national currencies, reinsurance facilities for intra-BRICS trade and with BRICS partners, the establishment of a grain exchange, and a new investment platform. These initiatives are not intended as a provocation against anyone, primarily the United States, but rather arise from the fact that the United States places strict control over all processes in these areas and demands unilateral concessions.

Consequently, we have not refused contacts with them to the extent that they are willing to engage on a mutually beneficial basis. Naturally, we are interested, together with our BRICS partners, in creating an architecture that will not be subject to unlawful actions by any player on the Western flank.

The principles of BRICS – equality, openness, and mutually beneficial cooperation – naturally resonate with the Eurasian Economic Union. In your view, could this integration project, the Greater Eurasian Partnership, also foster international cooperation, much like the SCO or ASEAN?

Certainly, I am convinced it can. The Greater Eurasian Partnership is, in essence, an initiative that has organically emerged on the international agenda. Many years ago, at the 2015 Russia–ASEAN summit, President Putin coined the term “Greater Eurasian Partnership”. It reflects the undeniable fact that Eurasia is the largest continent, the wealthiest, one of the fastest-growing regions – especially in its Asia-Pacific part – the most populous, and, importantly, a continent where several major civilisations originated and continue to thrive.

These include the Chinese, Indian, Arab, Persian, and Russian civilisations. The density and complexity of historical developments in Eurasia are unparalleled compared to Africa or Latin America. While these continents also possess ancient and rich histories, Eurasia’s cultural and civilisational diversity is distinctive.

Eurasia hosts multiple subregional organisations: the EAEU, CIS, ASEAN, the South Asian Association, and the Gulf Cooperation Council, among others. Africa and Latin America also have numerous subregional structures, yet both maintain a continental umbrella organisation: the African Union and CELAC. Eurasia, in contrast, lacks a single overarching continental framework.

This situation stems largely from history: European powers, from the colonial era, primarily focused on developing their own territories, while treating large parts of Eurasia – India, China, and others – as colonies. Consequently, attention was concentrated on Western Eurasia, while the rest was largely considered under European control.

These historical realities shaped the Euro-Atlantic approach to security. Following World War II, NATO, the European Union – which has become, in many respects, an extension of NATO – and the OSCE all reflect a Euro-Atlantic security logic, considering the active role of North America, particularly the United States and Canada.

All these organisations – NATO, with its unfulfilled assurances not to expand eastward; the EU, which dismantled a dense network of cooperation with Russia; and the OSCE, which has subordinated itself to unilateral Western actions, overlooking its founding principle of consensus – are, in effect, approaching the end of their functional relevance.

It is therefore not coincidental that our initiative, launched by the President in 2024 to strengthen Eurasian security and build a continental security architecture, is gaining momentum and attracting increasing interest.

Crucially, this concept of security, involving all continental states, rests on a solid material foundation – the Greater Eurasian Partnership. The stronger the links between regional and subregional integration organisations, the firmer the basis for a comprehensive security model. The process began with cooperation among the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and ASEAN, while also taking into account China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The heads of these organisations meet regularly to exchange information on their respective plans, allowing for the implementation of projects with greater efficiency and fewer redundancies through collaboration.

This cooperative approach is evident in initiatives such as the North–South International Transport Corridor, projects linking South Asia to Russia’s Far East, and schemes involving joint use of the Northern Sea Route. These processes continue to progress. Naturally, the Eurasian Partnership primarily involves countries on the continent, whereas BRICS is a global organisation attracting interest from all continents, now uniting not only Eurasian countries but also many in Latin America and Africa. This process is set to continue.

BRICS provides, in effect, an overarching framework for integration across continents. In the future, BRICS could serve as a platform to harmonise economic, social, and infrastructural development plans across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America.

The inclusion of Eurasian giants – China, India, Russia, and now Indonesia – positions BRICS as a potentially highly effective participant in the formation of the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

The BRICS chairmanship has now passed to India, which has outlined its priorities: resilience, innovation, cooperation, and sustainable development. How do these priorities align with your vision of international cooperation? What role does the global information space play, considering the vast amount of information in everyday life? And looking ahead, what outcomes of India’s chairmanship do you personally anticipate?

The priorities of each BRICS chair demonstrate a continuity of purpose. During Russia’s chairmanship in 2024, we launched several initiatives, all relating to alternative platforms and mechanisms to support the global economy. These initiatives continue to be refined, as was the case last year under Brazil’s chairmanship and now under India’s leadership.

India places particular emphasis on a subject that remains highly relevant: counter-terrorism. Terrorist activities are observed in Afghanistan, along its borders, and along the India–Pakistan–Afghanistan corridor, as well as in other hotspots. The Middle East, including its Asian part, remains a concern. This priority is particularly significant for us, especially as we actively work with India in the UN to advance a global counter-terrorism convention, which is already drafted, although consensus has not yet been reached.

India also prioritises issues of food and energy security. Energy security will be particularly important in the context of actions taken by the Trump administration in the global energy sector.

These are practical matters with tangible implications. India also emphasises ICT security, which we actively support. In the coming month or so, India will host an artificial intelligence summit, to which Russia is invited, and we are actively contributing to the agenda. This is significant, as norms regulating AI use between states, and AI applications by individual states, are only now being established.

This is a serious diplomatic effort with direct practical consequences. These norms will regulate behaviours that affect security. Some countries are actively introducing AI into military applications. While each state has the right to determine its own approach, certain countries are already attempting to centralise control, subordinating what states can and may do with AI in the military sphere. BRICS members will not accept infringements on their sovereignty, yet transparency remains crucial.

India’s chairmanship, in my view, presents a modern, highly relevant agenda that addresses today’s challenges while preparing for the future. We will actively support it.